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Medicaid and Education: 
The Impact of Medicaid Coverage on 
Children’s Educational Trajectory 
 







 This paper examines the impact of Medicaid and the State Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(CHIP) on children’s educational progress, namely whether they are on track with their expected 
educational trajectory.  It also examines cross-state variation in Medicaid policies and whether these 
different policies lead to different effects on the educational variable.  With individual-level data from the 
Current Population Survey from years 1995 through 2006, along with information regarding each state’s 
Medicaid policies, I seek to test the hypotheses that Medicaid/CHIP coverage will improve the likelihood 
of an individual being on track with his/her education and that states with qualitatively “better” Medicaid 
policies will see stronger positive effects on that educational measure.  Using an ordinary least squares 
regression model composed of Medicaid/CHIP indicators, demographic characteristics, state dummies, 
and state*Medicaid interaction terms, I find that, counter to the past research underlying these hypotheses, 
there is evidence that being covered by Medicaid or CHIP has a small, but statistically significant, 
negative impact on whether a child is on track with his/her education in a given year.  Furthermore, there 
is no evidence of a discernible pattern linking qualitatively “better” state Medicaid programs to higher 
values for the dependent variable.  Further evidence suggests, however, that there may be a cumulative 
positive effect of Medicaid/CHIP coverage; that is, longer exposure to available public health insurance 
programs is shown to have a positive impact on whether an individual is on track with his/her education.  
Although the data did not support the original hypotheses, this analysis does provide support for the idea 
that there is some relationship between Medicaid/CHIP coverage and educational variable, and therefore 
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 Health insurance plays a role in the health of individuals and thus the health of the population 
overall.  Health plans are commonly viewed as an important resource that can assist in maintaining and 
improving individuals’ health and therefore play a role in individuals’ health.  Consequently, government-
provided health plans are a tool for improving the health of the population.  Convincing evidence has 
shown that health insurance coverage can improve measures of health outcomes, especially for low-
income individuals and families, the population subgroups targeted by expansions of government health 
plan coverage.  In the United States, Medicaid is the main source of health insurance for such people.  
Whether people have health insurance coverage through Medicaid, or whether they have any health 
insurance coverage at all, has important bearing on his/her health and well-being. 
 Access to health insurance may have effects beyond the immediate impact on health.  In 
particular, access to health insurance may have positive effects on the education of Medicaid 
beneficiaries.  These positive may occur through two main channels: better health or indirect effects.   In 
the first channel, health insurance may improve children’s and young people’s health and may increase 
health care utilization, and this may improve their educational performance and their ultimate educational 
attainment.  In the second, access to public health insurance may also affect educational variables 
indirectly by freeing up resources that would have otherwise been spent on health insurance expenditures, 
such as monthly insurance premiums and co-pays for individual health services and procedures.  That 
may free families to spend more of those resources on education.  
In this paper, I seek to study the impact of Medicaid coverage on education for the intended 
beneficiaries of these social programs, that is, low-income individuals and families.  In particular, how 
does coverage by Medicaid affect educational attainment?  Because Medicaid policies vary by state, as I 
will discuss later, I also seek to determine how different state Medicaid policies affect education.  In 
particular, do individuals in states that have more generous Medicaid policies, that is, policies that allow 
for low-income people up to a higher income threshold to be covered and provide more services, 
experience different effects on their educational attainment?  Based on available data sources, I have 
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developed an operational definition of the relevant educational outcome.  The educational outcome shall 
be taken to mean whether an individual is on track with the typical educational trajectory given his/her 
age.  This educational variable is calculated as follows: 
	 / 5  
I subtract 5 in the denominator to account for the first 5 years of life which are typically not spent 
in formal schooling.  For example, an individual who is 14 years old would be expected to be in either 
eighth or ninth grade, which is 9 or 10 years of schooling, based on the course of education in the United 
States.  For this individual, then, being on track would mean that he/she has 9 years of school out of 
his/her age minus 5 (14 – 5 = 9), so his/her educational attainment score would be 1.  Using this measure 
of education as the dependent variable will allow for comparison of whether individuals are on track with 
their educational trajectories.  Defining the educational variable in this way will allow me to determine 
whether and how health insurance coverage broadly and Medicaid coverage in particular may affect 
education outcomes of low-income individuals. 
II. Medicaid and CHIP: Institutional Framework and History 
 Medicaid, enacted as Title XIX of the Social Security Act in 1965, is a joint federal-state program 
carried out by state governments to provide financial access to medical care to families and individuals 
who would not otherwise be able to afford health insurance and medical care.  Medicaid is thus the broad 
program of public health insurance for the low-income population in the US.  The State Children’s Health 
Insurance Program (SCHIP, later renamed CHIP), established by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, 
enables states to expand health care coverage to non-covered children in families with incomes below 
200% of the federal poverty level (FPL) who are ineligible for Medicaid (Swartz, 2009).  Medicaid and 
CHIP currently provide health coverage to nearly 60 million Americans.  Within this 60 million, 
Medicaid and CHIP cover more than 31 million children, accounting for half of all low-income children 
in the US (Medicaid.gov).  Covering half of all low-income children in the US is an accomplishment, 
though one might ask why Medicaid and CHIP do not cover a larger proportion of the targeted 
population.  One reason is that not all low-income families actually qualify for Medicaid and CHIP, 
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depending on their income and other circumstances.  Another significant reason is incomplete take-up of 
the program, which I will address later in this section. 
 States establish and administer their own Medicaid programs, following federal guidelines on the 
type, amount, duration, and scope of services.  States must cover certain mandatory benefits, such as 
preventive care and physician services, and can choose to provide other optional benefits, such as 
prescription drugs and rehabilitation therapies (Sommers, Ghose, & Rousseau, 2005).  Medicaid 
negotiates the fees paid to providers; and these fees are usually below the fees that private insurance plans 
pay (Swartz, 2009).  The federal government provides matching funds, called the Federal Medical 
Assistance Percentage, ranging from 50 to 80 percent of Medicaid costs depending on states’ per capita 
incomes (Medicaid.gov; Wachino, Rousseau, & Schneider, 2004).  In 2006, Medicaid accounted for 1 out 
of every 5 health care dollars spent in the nation, paid for 41% of all US births and 50% of all long-term 
care costs (for continuing nursing home care for those with chronic conditions), and represented the 
largest source of federal grant support to states (Ramirez de Arellano & Wolfe, 2007). 
 Before Medicaid, few low-income people had health insurance and medical care for the poor 
generally came from civic and religious groups, and this formed the basis for state and local governments 
providing health care to the poor (Swartz, 2009).  The Social Security Act of 1935 established a system 
for federal funds to match state expenditures and income assistance for dependent children and their 
mothers, the poor elderly, the blind, and crippled children.  States were in charge of administering these 
programs and setting eligibility criteria.  This state variation was the precursor to the variation in 
Medicaid eligibility that we have seen across states throughout the history of Medicaid (Swartz, 2009).   
Also during this period, public hospitals to care for the poor in urban areas became common.  
These public facilities led to a two-tiered system of medical care in which private facilities provided care 
to those who could afford it while public facilities provided care to the poor.  Another element of 
Medicaid’s history was established during this time: paying below-market rates.  This payment practice 
stems from welfare departments reimbursing private hospitals for care to the poor at rates below those 
charged to private patients in places where public hospitals were unavailable (Swartz, 2009). 
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 Between 1945 and 1965, private health insurance widely expanded, which stimulated the need for 
an alternative to private coverage.  The expansion of health insurance at this time occurred mostly 
through employment, so those who were uninsured were highly likely to be poor because they didn’t 
work, had only intermittent or seasonal employment, or had low-wage jobs (Swartz, 2009).  Those who 
were most often left out of private health insurance were therefore the poorest individuals; Medicaid 
ultimately developed as a way to attempt to remedy this situation. 
Between 1984 and 1990, Congress expanded the eligibility criteria for Medicaid through seven 
legislative acts (Swartz, 2009).  As a result of the eligibility criteria expansions and their continuing 
impact, almost 50 million people were covered by Medicaid for at least part of the year in fiscal year 
2005, and about half of those Medicaid enrollees, roughly 25.2 million people, were children.  The low-
income status of those who are eligible for and are receiving Medicaid benefits has significant 
implications for other aspects of their lives such as education, job opportunities, productivity, and 
earnings.  Providing public health insurance through Medicaid to these low-income individuals thus may 
also have implications for those other aspects of their lives. 
The Medicaid structure change of 1996 and the introduction of CHIP in 1997 are important points 
in the Medicaid timeline.  Before this point, Medicaid had been tied to Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC), so that Medicaid eligibility was heavily dependent upon welfare eligibility.  In 1996, 
Medicaid was officially decoupled from AFDC.  In 1997 the Balanced Budget Act established the State 
Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), allowing states to cover uninsured children in families with 
incomes below 200 percent of the federal poverty line (FPL) who were ineligible for Medicaid (Kaiser 
Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured).  These children are considered near-poor – their family 
incomes exceed the Medicaid eligibility threshold but are low enough to not be able to afford other health 
care coverage.  A dramatic increase in the proportion of children eligible for public health insurance 
coverage in the form of Medicaid and CHIP followed these policy changes. 
The fact that states administer their own Medicaid and CHIP programs means that they can set 
their own eligibility criteria (in accordance with federal minimums) and design other eligibility and 
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service rules.  This has led to a great deal of variation in Medicaid eligibility across states.  Accordingly, a 
person who is eligible for Medicaid coverage for a certain medical service in one state might be ineligible 
in another state or for another medical service simply based on that geographical location. 
Within this state variation in Medicaid programs, it is possible that some states may have 
qualitatively better programs than others.  This may mean that they have higher income eligibility 
thresholds and therefore allow for more people to be covered, or that they cover a wider array of services, 
or that they reimburse health care providers at higher rates, and so on.  Much of the literature on Medicaid 
tends to avoid making value judgments as it is difficult to determine what makes one program better than 
another, but there have been reports that attempt to rank states’ programs.  A report by Ramirez de 
Arellano & Wolfe (2007) ranks each state program based on four categories: eligibility, scope of services, 
quality of care, and reimbursement.  Eligibility was the most heavily weighted category.  In 2007, the top 
five states based on overall ranking (in descending order) were Massachusetts, Nebraska, Vermont, 
Alaska, and Wisconsin.  The five states with the lowest overall scores (i.e. most basic programs) in 
ascending order were Mississippi, Idaho, Texas, Oklahoma, and South Dakota (see Appendix A for full 
rankings).  Rhode Island ranked #1 in the eligibility category; its Medicaid program covered the 
medically needy and other optional groups and had generous FPL requirements, covering the near-poor 
and not just the poorest people.  While the national eligibility cap by annual income (in 2007) was 
$10,849 for working parents, the corresponding figure for Rhode Island was $31,790.  Rhode Island also 
covered parents through CHIP, which has been found to enhance their children’s access to care (Ramirez 
de Arellano & Wolfe, 2007).  On the other end of the spectrum, Indiana ranked last in the eligibility 
category; its Medicaid program excluded those made poor by extreme medical expenses (the medically 
needy) and had very low cut-offs, thereby restricting services to only the neediest.  Large numbers of 
people in Indiana were therefore excluded from Medicaid just because of where they happened to live. 
III. Notes on Differences Among Medicaid Eligibility, Take-Up, and Utilization 
The main Medicaid variable used in this analysis is whether an individual is covered by 
Medicaid.  However, there are multiple layers of Medicaid: eligibility, enrollment (or take-up), and use.  
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It is one thing to rank the quality of states’ Medicaid programs by their eligibility thresholds, scope of 
services, and so on.  But in considering the quality of a Medicaid program one must also consider the 
take-up rate to see whether the intended beneficiaries are actually enrolling in the program.  The take-up 
rate is measured by how many people, out of the eligible population, actually enroll in the program.  This 
is an important concept for social programs because if the program exists, but potential beneficiaries are 
not participating, then that program cannot deliver its intended impact.  Historically, researchers have 
paid attention to rules about eligibility for Medicaid and other social programs, but virtually no attention 
to how these rules are enforced or made known to people who may be eligible (Currie, 2004).  
Consequently, it is difficult to understand program take-up in terms of whether and why people 
participate in available programs and in terms of measuring take-up rates for these programs. 
There are several factors that contribute to a potential beneficiary not enrolling in Medicaid or 
another public assistance program.  First, there are often costs associated with participation.  One cost is 
stigma.  Since Medicaid is a means-tested program, eligibles may not participate because of the negative 
perception they associate with receiving public assistance; they may see participation as a sign of 
weakness or an inability to take care of themselves.  Other costs include costs of learning about and 
applying for the program, which may deter individuals from using the program (Currie, 2004).  In the 
case where the potential beneficiary is a child, these transaction costs are most often borne by someone 
other than the eligible individual, and this other individual may be less willing to bear the costs of 
enrollment and participation for someone else than he/she would be for him or herself (Currie, 2004).   
Even more simply, it is possible that some people may not be aware of their own eligibility.  
Whether people know about their eligibility and whether they enroll is often dependent upon state and 
local governments’ and community organizations’ efforts in improving outreach, reducing stigma, 
simplifying enrollment, and retaining eligible enrollees (Selden, Hudson, & Banthin, 2004).  
Additionally, research has shown that the costs of enrollment and the likelihood of ignorance of eligibility 
may be highest for the families and individuals that are in greatest need (Currie, 2004). 
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Beyond understanding why people do or do not participate in Medicaid, understanding take-up 
rates and how they vary across states and across time requires knowing both how many people are 
covered and how many people are eligible for coverage under each state’s Medicaid and CHIP policies.  
While the number of people covered is generally monitored, it is difficult to measure how many people 
are eligible for coverage because there are many criteria that determine whether someone is eligible for 
Medicaid beyond whether an individual’s family income is above or below the state’s eligibility cutoff.  
In their study on changes in Medicaid eligibility and coverage, Selden, Hudson, & Banthin (2004) group 
children into three classes of eligibility: welfare-related eligibles1, poverty-related eligibles2, and CHIP 
eligibles3.    To conduct this particular study, which focused on changes in children’s eligibility and 
coverage in 1996-2002, these researchers ran a simulation based on income rules, assistance unit 
composition, and asset tests to determine whether an individual in their sample was eligible for Medicaid 
(Selden, Hudson, & Banthin, 2004).  It is quite clear that there is no easy way to determine this “number 
of eligibles” figure since there are so many detailed conventions across which eligibility is evaluated.  As 
such, I will address the issues of eligibility and take-up in my sample and analysis, but the main variable 
of focus will remain whether an individual reports that they are covered by Medicaid or CHIP. 
To begin to answer the question of how Medicaid affects whether an individual is on track with 
his/her education, there must be variation within the group of individuals under study.  The value 
judgments from the Ramirez de Arellano & Wolfe report tell us about recent variation in Medicaid across 
states, and we can also see evidence of this variation simply by looking at the different eligibility 
thresholds across states (see Appendix C).  As a result of these differences in eligibility rules, otherwise 
                                                            
1 Welfare-related eligibles include children in families eligible for welfare as well as children eligible through 
medically needy programs, free Medicaid waiver programs, and separate state-funded programs providing coverage 
to immigrant families.   
2 Poverty-related eligibles include children born into families with net incomes below the federal poverty guidelines, 
children age six in families below 133% or poverty, and those eligible through state expansions covering older 
children and those in families with higher incomes. 
3 CHIP eligibles include children who are eligible for Medicaid CHIP, separate state CHIP programs, or separate 
state-funded programs for immigrant children. 
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similar children residing in different states have had differential exposure to Medicaid policies and 
differential opportunities for medical care. 
Individual variation in Medicaid coverage allows for the analysis of the effect of that Medicaid 
coverage on other potentially Medicaid-related outcomes, such as education, for different individuals.  In 
addition, the variation in Medicaid policies across states may lead to variation in those Medicaid-related 
outcomes, such as education, across states as well.  Based on the insights provided by the institutional 
framework and history of Medicaid and the literature to be discussed in the next section, I hypothesize 
that those individuals who are covered by Medicaid or CHIP are more likely to have been on track with 
their educational trajectories.  I further hypothesize that this effect of Medicaid coverage on education 
will vary based on the state in which an individual lives; more specifically, individuals in states with 
higher quality Medicaid policies and higher eligibility thresholds will see a larger positive effect on their 
educational variable (see section V for formal presentation of hypotheses). 
IV. Literature Review 
 To understand the relationship between education and Medicaid, we must understand the causal 
pathway through which health care coverage may impact education based on the available literature.  
There is a great deal of literature on the relationship between health insurance coverage and health status, 
as well as on the relationship between health and educational outcomes.  There has also been some 
research on the relationship between health insurance coverage and education, although there is 
understandably much less literature on this topic since it is an indirect linkage. 
A. Impact of Health Insurance on Health 
 The first channel through which Medicaid, or health care coverage more broadly, may affect 
education is by way of affecting health.  This effect on health may occur through the utilization of health 
care services that results from having health insurance coverage.  Currie & Gruber (1996), using 
demographic and insurance coverage data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) in conjunction with 
health utilization and status data from the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS), found evidence of a 
positive relationship between health insurance coverage and medical care utilization.  They found that the 
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expansion of Medicaid eligibility that began in 1984 and continued through the 1990s led to increased 
utilization of medical care.  They also used two-stage least squares analysis to determine that increases in 
the fraction of children eligible for Medicaid in each state (resulting from the expanded eligibility 
policies) had a significant negative effect on the child mortality rate, with the effect being strongest for 
the poorest families.  This suggests that increased eligibility was associated with a sizable and significant 
reduction in child mortality, thus indicating that the eligibility expansion led to a reduction in poor health 
outcomes for infants and children, especially in poor families. 
 Li & Baughman (2010) provide more evidence on the relationship between health insurance and 
health care utilization.  Using data from the National Survey of America’s Families (NSAF) to investigate 
the links between eligibility for CHIP, health insurance coverage, medical care utilization, and health 
outcomes, they found that higher coverage rates translated into increased utilization of the types of 
medical care that would be expected to improve children’s health.  They found that CHIP significantly 
increased health insurance coverage rates for American children and that higher coverage appears to have 
translated into increased use of certain types of preventive medical care, including well-child doctor 
visits.  This suggests improvement in certain child health indicators, such as up-to-date immunizations.  
While the authors were not wholly successful in finding significant evidence regarding the effect of the 
expanded public health insurance on most available measures of overall health, they did find that the 
expanded coverage led to a reduction in deteriorating health, that is, health being worse than in the 
previous year, for the 6 through 17-year-old age group.  This finding is important for the present study as 
it demonstrates that public health insurance does have a positive effect on beneficiaries’ health, which 
may later translate into a positive effect on educational achievement. 
 More research on the relationship of health insurance coverage and health status comes from a 
study of public health insurance besides Medicaid in the United States: the National Cooperative Medical 
System (NCMS) in rural China.  In their study of this public health insurance program, Chen & Gin 
(2012) found evidence from raw data showing that, on average, NCMS-insured households had lower 
young child mortality and maternal mortality than did non-insured households.  Although their analyses 
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show that these effects may have been driven by the endogenous introduction and take-up of NCMS, 
evidence from the studies of US public health insurance programs, mentioned above, allow us to be fairly 
confident that there is a positive link between public health insurance and health outcomes. 
B. Impact of Health on Education 
 The next part of the causal pathway of the effect of public health insurance on education is 
through the effect of health on education.  Past research has generally shown a positive relationship 
between these two variables.  That is, better health tends to lead to better educational outcomes.  Children 
with poor health may be poorly equipped to learn, so alleviating children’s health problems could remove 
barriers to success in the classroom (Levine & Schanzenbach, 2009).  Case, Fertig, & Paxson (2003), in 
their study of the British health and education systems, found that children who experience poor health 
reach significantly lower educational attainment; this could be a result poor health making an individual 
consistently absent from school or unable to fully engage in schoolwork.   In this study, the educational 
measure was the passage of the English O-Level exam (taken at age 15), and results indicate that health in 
childhood had pronounced effects on educational attainment.  Each childhood health condition at age 7 
was found to be associated with a 7% reduction in the probability of passing the O-level, demonstrating 
that health has a positive impact on education.  These authors also examined the effect of health on other 
outcomes such as adult health and future earnings.  The results of these further empirical analyses 
suggested that health status in early and middle adulthood predicted future earnings and that the effect of 
poor childhood health on educational attainment was significant for predicting subsequent earnings.  This 
study helps to demonstrate a key idea for my research: that health status in early childhood has significant 
bearing on individuals’ future economic and social well-being. 
 Other research has found similar results regarding the links between childhood health status and 
health and economic outcomes in young adulthood.  Contoyannis & Dooley (2010) studied the Canadian 
public health insurance system to determine the relationship of physical and behavioral-emotional health 
problems in childhood to schooling, health, and labor market outcomes in young adulthood as well as the 
role of health status in the intergenerational correlation of economic status.  Using data on child and 
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family characteristics such as parental income, parental education, and child health in the 1983 Ontario 
Child Health Study (OCHS) and socio-economic outcomes such as educational attainment, health, 
earnings, wages, and hours of paid work from the 2000 OCHS, least squares estimates indicate that 
childhood health problems are negatively associated with educational attainment, especially the 
probability of attaining a university degree.  These results are consistent with the other research described 
here as they also find that bad health has a negative impact on education. 
C. Impact of Health Insurance on Education 
Health insurance may also have effects on education outside of the channels elaborated above.  
First, health insurance might reduce health or private insurance expenditures by the household such that 
families can reallocate to education the resources previously devoted to health problems (Alcaraz et al, 
2012; Levine & Schanzenbach, 2009).  Health insurance could also help households to better cope with 
health shocks without interfering with their decisions regarding education.  This is important because 
household health shocks lead to reductions in the likelihood of completing high school on time, attending 
college, and completing a bachelor’s degree (Johnson & Reynolds, 2011).  Finally, introduction of 
publicly provided health insurance could also reduce precautionary savings and therefore release 
additional resources for the household (Gruber & Yelowitz, 1999). 
 Although there is less literature on the relationship of health insurance coverage and educational 
outcomes due to the indirect nature of this linkage, some researchers have explored this relationship.  
After all, if Medicaid and other public health insurance plans have effects beyond the immediate impact 
on access to health care and health status, it is worthwhile to attempt to understand the mechanisms of 
these effects.  One study of this link examined how Medicaid expansions starting in 1984 affected 
children’s academic performance (Levine & Schanzenbach, 2009).  Relying on the cross-state variation 
over time and across ages in children’s health insurance eligibility brought about by the Medicaid 
expansions, Levine & Schanzenbach investigated the effect of the public insurance expansions on reading 
and math test scores.  They hypothesized that individuals in states and years with more broadly available 
public health insurance would experience a decline in low birth weights and that better health status at 
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birth would be linked to improved educational outcomes.  They used a complex system of simulated 
instruments to determine whether a child would be eligible for coverage under the rules in each state and 
year based on the child’s age and family income.  They then ran those simulated responses through a 
program that identified their simulated health insurance eligibility at birth, in the years since birth, and at 
the time of the study.  Their results showed a positive and statistically significant relationship between 
eligibility at birth and reading scores.  They also concluded that the improvement in reading test scores 
associated with children’s public health insurance expansions is at least partially attributable to direct 
improvements in children’s health.  This result therefore supports the notion that expanding access to 
public health insurance may improve educational performance.  This study serves as the basis for my 
hypothesis that Medicaid coverage has a positive effect on educational achievement.  However, as I will 
explain, I will be approaching this question from a different angle.   
 Another important study on the link between public health insurance coverage and educational 
outcomes looks at the Mexican public health insurance program, Seguro Popular (SP).  Alcaraz, Chiquiar, 
Orraca, & Salcedo (2012) used data from a panel of municipalities from 2007 to 2009 to investigate this 
relationship.  They focused on the effect of the expansion of coverage, as measured by the proportion of 
the population in the municipality covered by SP, on standardized test scores for primary school children.  
Past research on SP has suggested that SP has a positive impact on health levels and that much of this 
effect came through an income channel; that is, the public health insurance program reduced household 
expenditures and thus allowed families to reallocate those resources to education-related expenses.  The 
authors hypothesized that SP could affect academic performance through improved health and through 
the aforementioned income channel.  Results of their analysis suggested that SP has a positive and 
statistically significant effect on children’s academic performance in primary school and that the effect 
could be attributed to either improved health or to an income effect, that is, from lower health-related 
expenditures.  This evidence of the indirect positive effect of public health insurance on academic 
performance suggests that there are additional paths through which the public health insurance program 
may translate into effects on longer-term outcomes like education, income, and economic development. 
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 In considering the above studies, it is important to be mindful that these studies were evaluating 
the effects of programs that don’t target education directly.  Medicaid is a program of health insurance to 
improve access to care for low-income individuals and families, so the effects shown by Levine & 
Schanzenbach and those that I’m seeking to show in this paper are indirect effects, and results must be 
considered in that vein.  Conclusions regarding the relationship between Medicaid and educational 
attainment are likely to be small since they are indirect effects, rather than the explicitly intended effects 
of the program.  That said, Medicaid as a public health insurance program clearly has potential to impact 
outcomes beyond immediate health effects, and I seek to investigate those extended outcomes. 
 As previously stated, the indirect nature of the link between Medicaid and educational attainment 
means that there has not been much research on this subject.  The Levine & Schanzenbach study is the 
best example I have seen to date.  They use individual-level data and focus on the effect of Medicaid 
eligibility on educational performance, measured by standardized test scores in 4th and 8th grade.  Looking 
at standardized test scores provides valuable insight, but I would like to see the effect of Medicaid 
coverage on a broader educational outcome.  A standardized test score tells us about the student’s aptitude 
and performance at one point in his/her life, but not about later years of education and overall educational 
trajectory.  In addition, the source of variation for the Levine & Schanzenbach study is the change in 
eligibility rules over time, which does not account for the state-by-state variation in Medicaid programs.   
I will be taking a different and broader view of the question at hand.  I will examine how Medicaid 
coverage in different states affects education, specifically whether an individual is on track with his/her 
education given his/her age.  This educational measure will serve as the dependent variable, and the main 
independent variables will be those that tell us about Medicaid coverage as it varies across individuals and 
states.  Specific details of my approach and methodology will be elaborated in section IV. 
D. Cross-State Variation in Medicaid-Related Variables 
 I have hypothesized that there will be differences in the effects of Medicaid coverage on whether 
an individual is on track with his/her educational trajectory.  There has been research on whether state-
specific Medicaid policies lead to significant differences in Medicaid-related variables for low-income 
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children.  Long & Coughlin (2002) conducted a study to determine whether states’ Medicaid programs 
led to differences in access and use of Medicaid among low-income children on Medicaid.  Using data 
from the 1997 National Survey of America’s Families (NSAF) and controlling for variations in the 
characteristics of children on Medicaid and variations in local health care markets, the results of this study 
provide evidence of an association between Medicaid spending in different states and access and use 
among children on Medicaid in those states.  In particular, by comparing thirteen states’ Medicaid 
spending per low-income child, Long & Coughlin found that, relative to children residing in states with 
the lowest Medicaid spending per low-income child, children on Medicaid in the higher spending states 
were more likely to have a usual source of care and a well-child visit.  This suggests that children on 
Medicaid in states with higher Medicaid spending per low-income child, such as Massachusetts, have 
somewhat better access and use than do children in the lowest spending states, such as Texas.   
However, the analyses of the relevant data yielded only a moderate association, and also revealed 
evidence that children in the highest spending states were also significantly more likely to have an 
emergency room visit, which Long & Coughlin suggest may indicate potential problems with access to 
care in those states.  The weakness of the association between states’ spending on Medicaid per low-
income child and children’s access and use of health care suggests to me that: 1) there is potentially 
another way to measure the effect of different state Medicaid programs on the access and use variables or 
2) that one must first look at the fundamental Medicaid variable, that is, whether a person is covered by 
Medicaid, to find a stronger association of differences in state programs and the access and use variables.  
Long & Coughlin’s findings are important for my study because they provide evidence for the idea that 
the ability of otherwise similar Medicaid recipients to obtain care may well depend on the state in which 
they live.  It therefore follows that differences in state Medicaid programs may also lead to differences in 
other potentially Medicaid-related variables, such as an individual’s educational trajectory. 
E. Other Factors Affecting the Educational Variable 
 Before addressing the indirect relationship between Medicaid and educational progress, it is 
necessary to consider the other factors besides health insurance that may affect this dependent variable.  
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In a review of the empirical research on the links between investments in children and children’s 
attainments, Haveman & Wolfe (1995) look at studies focusing on the potential effects on children of 
parental choices and neighborhood characteristics.  They found that variables describing parental 
characteristics are the most commonly used in studies of children’s educational attainment.  Among these, 
the most fundamental economic factor is the human capital of parents, measured by the number of years 
of schooling attained.  This variable was included in virtually all of the studies under review and was 
statistically significant and qualitatively important no matter how it was defined. 
The income level of the family is the best measure of economic resources devoted to the child 
and is often included in studies of children’s educational attainment.  Almost all studies in this review 
found family income to be positively associated with the educational attainment of the child, and the 
income variable is statistically significant in more than half of all cases in which a positive relationship 
was estimated.  Other parental investment factors that have been found to have statistically significant and 
quantitatively large effects on children’s educational attainment include the source of parents’ income 
(earned versus public assistance), family structure, the extent of mother’s work, number of geographic 
moves during childhood, number of siblings, religiousness, school-related parenting practices, and 
presence of reading materials in the home.  Accounting for these demographic variables will be important 
in my examination of the effect of Medicaid policies across states on educational attainment. 
V. Data and Methodology 
 The main source of data for my study is the Current Population Survey (CPS).  This is a cross-
sectional survey sponsored jointly by the US Census Bureau and the US Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS).  The survey is conducted monthly on individuals within about 60,000 households representing the 
civilian non-institutionalized population.  The CPS Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) 
also includes several supplemental questions on subjects such as income, poverty, education, migration, 
and more.  The US Census Bureau conducts the ASEC over a three-month period, in February, March, 
and April, with most of the data collected in the month of March. The ASEC often covers an even broader 
sample than does the CPS, surveying individuals within approximately 78,000 households nationwide.  
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The ASEC provides supplemental data on poverty, geographic mobility/migration, and work experience; 
data also include information on nine noncash income sources: food stamps, school lunch program, 
employer-provided group health insurance plan, employer-provided pension plan, personal health 
insurance, Medicaid, Medicare, CHAMPUS (supplemental military health care), and energy assistance.  
The CPS ASEC thus provides data concerning family characteristics, household composition, marital 
status, education attainment, health insurance coverage, citizenship, previous year’s income from all 
sources, work experience, receipt of noncash benefits, poverty, program participation, and geographic 
mobility.  By collecting this data on an individual level while identifying the state in which each 
individual lives, the CPS allows for analysis of education and Medicaid conditions in the nation overall. 
 I will use data from 1995 through 2006 to cover the period after the most recent policy 
expansions within Medicaid as well as the establishment of CHIP.  The CPS ASEC includes several 
variables regarding Medicaid and education.  It includes each respondent’s level of educational 
attainment; for younger respondents, this variable represents their current grade if they are still in school 
and for older respondents, their educational attainment is reported as their highest level of schooling or 
degree attained.  Combining this variable with age allows me to generate the share of the respondent’s life 
spent in school, by taking the educational attainment variable as a fraction of age minus five, as explained 
in section II, as the main education variable for this analysis.  The survey also contains information 
regarding whether the respondent is currently (at the time of the survey) covered by Medicaid or CHIP.  It 
also has information on broader measures of health insurance, most importantly on whether the 
respondent is covered by any source of health insurance, either private or public.  Determination of 
whether an individual has any source of health insurance will allow me to distinguish people who have 
Medicaid from people who have non-Medicaid health insurance and to interpret results accordingly. 
 In addition to these focus variables, the CPS also includes state, gender, age, race, and more.  
Additional demographic variables that will be useful as controls are the educational attainment of each of 
the respondent’s parents.  Importantly, the CPS also includes information on each representative’s total 
family income as well as the cutoff, in dollars, for evaluating an individual’s poverty status.  This cutoff 
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information accounts for family size, number of children, and age of the family householder.  I can create 
a measure of relative income for each respondent in the sample by taking the family income relative to the 
poverty cutoff, and this relative income will serve as a valuable adjusted measure of the income 
conditions for each individual, which important to account for when analyzing the educational variable. 
 There are some limitations of the Current Population Survey for this analysis.  First, the fact that 
the CPS is a cross-sectional data source limits the analysis to using information on education and 
Medicaid/CHIP coverage in a discrete time period – it provides data on what grade a respondent is in in 
that survey year, and whether that respondent is covered by Medicaid or CHIP in that survey year.  Just 
using a respondent’s current grade in school as the educational variable would not tell us anything about 
that respondent’s progress or achievement, as age constrains the grade that one could possibly be in.  I 
developed the dependent educational variable, the share of an individual’s life spent in school (variable 
YRSCHL), to address the first issue as it provides a contemporaneous measure of educational progress.  
Additionally, the Medicaid/CHIP coverage information is specific to whether the respondent is covered at 
the time of the survey, meaning that these data do not allow us to analyze how an individual’s Medicaid 
or CHIP coverage in the past affects his/her current educational trajectory.  Therefore, we cannot draw 
any conclusions about how early childhood health status is connected to Medicaid coverage and how that 
may affect the educational variable in the present year.  That said, the current Medicaid/CHIP coverage 
information is still valuable for gaining insight into the relationship in question. 
  A second limitation of this data source is that the sample includes children who have potentially 
been on Medicaid or CHIP for less than 12 months in the year prior to the survey and children who may 
have been covered by other types of insurance over that year and in earlier years of their lives.  As we do 
not know the full history of each respondent’s health insurance coverage, we are not able to control for 
these other sources of health insurance and therefore cannot fully attribute the results solely to the effect 
of current Medicaid/CHIP coverage.  Nonetheless, the information available from the CPS is valuable in 
providing a snapshot of how Medicaid and CHIP coverage may affect educational paths. 
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 To see differences in Medicaid’s effects across states, I have included statewide Medicaid 
information.  An important datum that I have employed in constructing sub-samples and variables is the 
cutoff for Medicaid and CHIP coverage eligibility, reported as a percentage of the FPL.  This varies by 
state and may also vary from year to year.  Fortunately, there have not been major changes that would be 
likely to have significant effects within the timeframe of this study.  Therefore, I have chosen to use the 
eligibility cutoffs for the 6-16 age group from 2000 as listed in the October 2000 Kaiser Commission on 
Medicaid and the Uninsured report (see Appendix C). 
 Based on the eligibility thresholds from 2000 and the relative income variable, I am able to 
crudely determine an individual’s eligibility for Medicaid.  By comparing an individual’s relative family 
income to the eligibility cutoff, I created a qualitative variable to indicate whether an individual’s family 
income makes them eligible for Medicaid coverage.  This is a crude indicator of eligibility because I have 
used the cutoffs from 2000 for all years and because there are other factors besides income, such as a 
severe health condition, that may make an individual eligible for Medicaid.  However, as long as we bear 
in mind that this indicator is somewhat crude, it is still helpful in describing and understanding the 
characteristics of the relevant sample.  Furthermore, constructing the eligibility indicator allows for 
another variable to be considered in this model: an indicator for those who are deemed eligible for 
Medicaid but are not enrolled in the program; this qualitative variable will provide insight into how actual 
coverage versus eligibility affects whether an individual is on track with his/her education.   
My sample consists of individuals between the ages of 6 and 19.  After applying the eligibility 
indicator and breaking down the states by percentiles according to their ranking from the Ramirez de 
Arellano & Wolfe report, some of the characteristics of this sample, based on raw data, are shown below. 
Table 1. Sample Characteristics 
(ages 6-19) Whole Sample Covered by Medicaid Eligible, Not Covered 
All States 
Number of observations 516,066 103,920 69,145 
Average age 11.85 11.05 12.01 
Average share of life in 
school 
0.876 0.856 0.859 
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Average total family 
income ($) 
61,140.90 26,186.79 17,476.44 
Average relative income 
(total family income / 
poverty cutoff) 




(some college, no degree) 
11.54 
(12th grade, no diploma) 
11.75 




(some college, no degree) 
11.43 
(12th grade, no diploma) 
11.58 
(12th grade, no diploma) 
Top 25th Percentile from Ramirez de Arellano & Wolfe Rankings 
Number of observations 120,613 26,397 17,941 
Average age 11.86 11.19 11.86 
Average share of life in 
school 
.880 0.863 0.867 
Average total family 
income ($) 
65,984.61 28,732.67 22,586 
Average relative income 
(total family income / 
poverty cutoff) 




(some college, no degree) 
11.9 
(HS diploma or equiv.) 
12.44 







(HS diploma or equiv.) 
12.45 
(HS diploma or equiv.) 
Bottom 25th Percentile from Ramirez de Arellano & Wolfe Rankings 
Number of observations 122,197 22,316 17,871 
Average age 11.82 10.96 12.016 
Average share of life in 
school 
.869 0.845 0.852 
Average total family 
income ($) 
58,796.08 25,345.25 17,776.50 
Average relative income 
(total family income / 
poverty cutoff) 




(some college, no degree) 
11.6 
(12th grade, no diploma) 
11.52 




(some college, no degree) 
11.42 
(12th grade, no diploma) 
11.27 
(12th grade, no diploma) 
 
These data tell us about some demographic characteristics of our sample.  First, it is noteworthy 
that in all states as well as in the percentile sub-samples, both average income and average relative 
income among those covered by Medicaid are lower than the overall average, and lower still for those 
who are eligible for Medicaid but are not covered.  This means that those who are able to but do not 
actually participate in Medicaid and CHIP are actually worse off in terms of income than are those 
eligibles that do take up the program.   This is consistent with the idea that the costs of participating in the 
program are highest precisely for those individuals in the greatest need in terms of income (Currie, 2004), 
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as discussed earlier.  Past literature has also shown that those who are at the lowest income levels may get 
the greatest benefit from Medicaid coverage (Currie & Gruber, 1996).  The idea of take-up versus 
eligibility therefore has significant social implications because it suggests that those who stand to benefit 
the most from social programs are often the ones who are least likely to be enrolled in the program. 
 Another notable aspect of this data description is that, in all sample breakdowns, the average 
share of life in school is lower for the populations that are either covered or eligible and not covered by 
Medicaid than it is for the overall sample.  This indicates that there is potentially a fundamental difference 
between those who are covered by and eligible for Medicaid and the rest of the sample.  Deeper 
quantitative analysis of the data will help to reveal what factors contribute to whether an individual is on 
track and if Medicaid coverage is one of those factors. 
Using this crude eligibility indicator, I am also able to calculate a rough estimate of each state’s 
take-up rate by calculating the ratio of the number of people covered by Medicaid or CHIP in each state 
to the number of people deemed eligible for coverage in that state.  Calculating this figure (variable 
TAKEUP) for each state, applying it to all individuals within that state, and including it in the model will 
allow me to get insight into how a state’s take-up rate affects educational trajectories.  In this context, the 
crude take-up rate may serve as a proxy for the quality of each state’s programs as it represents how 
effective a state’s program is at actually covering the intended beneficiaries of the program. 
A final variable to be included in this model is each state’s Medicaid payments per enrollee (PPE) 
for children (variable MCAIDPPE).  This information comes from the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid 
and the Uninsured and Urban Institute estimates based on data from the Medicaid Statistical Information 
System and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services.  It is reported in current year dollars and is 
calculated as the total spending in each state, by both the state and federal government, on Medicaid for 
children, divided by the number of children enrolled in that state’s Medicaid program.  This data is only 
available starting in 2000, so this variable for the years 1995-1999 are missing.  Additionally, this 
variable accounts only for state and federal spending on Medicaid, but not on CHIP.  As this figure does 
not represent the expenditures on each child through CHIP, this variable serves as a proxy for what each 
22 
 
state may be spending on each child on Medicaid.  This variable will serve as another potential indicator 
for a state’s generosity in its Medicaid program.  Higher Medicaid PPE values may indicate greater 
utilization of health care services among enrollees or a wider scope of services covered by the state’s 
Medicaid policy, which may have positive impacts on children’s health (Currie & Gruber, 1996; Li & 
Baughman, 2010), which may then be indirectly extended to a positive effect on children’s education. 
With this wealth of information, it is possible to generate a model that can provide insight into 
how Medicaid coverage affects whether a child is on track with his/her education.  With the available 
data, I will estimate the following equation through ordinary least squares… 
1 				
	 	
	 ∗  
Where… 
 YRSCHL = share of each individual’s life spent in school; (current grade)/(age – 5) 
 HINSCAID = dummy for public insurance coverage (Medicaid or CHIP) 
UNINSURED = dummy for individuals who are uninsured  
RELINC = relative income; (family income)/(poverty threshold) 
 FEMALE = dummy variable to indicate gender  
 BLACK = dummy variable to indicate race 
EDUCMOM = mother’s educational attainment 
 EDUCPOP = father’s educational attainment 
TIME = years since 1995  
POVERTY = dummy variable to indicate poverty status, i.e. whether an individual is above or 
below the federal poverty line based on their household income 
ELIGNOTCOV = dummy variable to indicate that a person would be eligible for Medicaid based 
on income rules from 2000, but that they were not covered in the previous year 
 POTENTIALEXP = potential exposure to CHIP; (year – 1997)/age 
 CHIPEXP = POTENTIALEXP*HINSCAID 
 TAKEUP = crude measure of Medicaid take-up rate in individual’s home state 
 MCAIDPPE = Medicaid payments per child enrollee 
 state dummies = indicator for individuals’ geographic locations 
state*HINSCAID = interaction terms indicating effect of Medicaid in a particular state 
 
Beyond the variables discussed above, I have also included other variables to work toward 
explaining the variation in children’s educational trajectories and how Medicaid and CHIP coverage may 
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be influencing the educational outcome.  First, because CHIP was enacted in 1997, it is necessary to 
account for this development in the model for the relationship between Medicaid/CHIP coverage and the 
educational variable.  I shall account for this in two ways.  First, there is each individual’s potential 
exposure to CHIP (variable POTENTIALEXP).  This can be calculated as the survey year minus 1997, 
divided by the individual’s age.  This tells us the proportion of the individual’s life that CHIP has been 
existence and therefore indicates how long any individual in the sample may have had the opportunity to 
actually be covered by CHIP.  Second, this potential exposure to CHIP can be applied to those who are 
covered by Medicaid or CHIP via an interaction term to see how the potential exposure specifically 
affects those individuals in the sample who are actually covered by the program (variable CHIPEXP). 
 I have also included state dummy variables in this regression equation4.  These dummies are 
necessary to account for how living in a certain state affects an individual’s educational trajectory.  To 
account for how Medicaid coverage in a specific state affects the educational variable, I have created 
state*Medicaid interaction terms.  Taken together, the state dummies will control for non-Medicaid 
factors within a state that may affect education, and the interaction terms will provide insight into how 
Medicaid or CHIP coverage in a specific state affects education. 
Taking all of the dummy variables together, the reference individual or “norm” for this regression is 
an individual in West Virginia who is covered by a source of health insurance other than Medicaid or 
CHIP, not in poverty, male, and not black.  Results will therefore indicate how an individual in this 
sample compares to the reference individual.  By estimating this equation, I can come to some 
conclusions regarding the effect of Medicaid coverage on the educational variable at hand.  To review, 
from section II, the hypotheses to be tested in this analysis are as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between an individual being covered by Medicaid or 
CHIP and whether that individual is on track with their education; that is, being covered by Medicaid 
                                                            
4 In order to avoid issues of perfect collinearity in this regression, West Virginia will be excluded from the regression.  This 
choice is based on West Virginia’s standing in the middle of the Medicaid eligibility rankings. 
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or CHIP will mean a higher value for the proportion of a child’s life spent in school.  In mathematical 
terms, I hypothesize that βHINSCAID > 0. 
Hypothesis 2: Following hypothesis 1, there is a positive relationship between an individual’s 
Medicaid/CHIP coverage and the educational variable in each state, or if there is not a positive 
coefficient on the state*Medicaid interaction term, then the magnitude of a negative coefficient is 
smaller than that the magnitude of the positive coefficient on the Medicaid/CHIP coverage indicator 
such that the sum of these coefficients for each state is positive.  That is, βstate*Medicaid > 0 for each 
state, or if βstate*Medicaid < 0, | βstate*Medicaid| < | βHINSCAID|. 
Hypothesis 3: The pattern in the sums of βHINSCAID and βstate*Medicaid for each state will align with the 
rankings from the Ramirez de Arellano & Wolfe such that those states that are ranked higher will 
have a more positive sum of the relevant coefficients. 
VI. Results 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for a selection of variables for the sample of children age 6 to 19. 
Table 2. Summary Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
YRSCHL 162430 0.875594 0.100636 0 2.2 
HINSCAID 162430 0.152244 0.359258 0 1 
UNINSURED 162430 0.192391 0.394179 0 1 
RELINC 162430 3.575689 3.501533 -1.712825 58.92812 
FEMALE 162430 0.487361 0.499842 0 1 
BLACK 162430 0.12036 0.325383 0 1 
EDUCMOM 137400 12.942 2.927215 0 22 
EDUCPOP 111435 13.28898 3.285422 0 22 
POVERTY 162430 20.88915 4.624819 10 23 
ELIGNOTCOV 160366 0.07708 0.442498 0 1 
TAKEUP 160366 0.728153 0.275203 0.25 1.447761 
MCAIDPPE 112474 1863.245 824.5364 932 12662 
  
The correlation between the Medicaid or CHIP coverage variable (HINSCAID) and the 
dependent educational variable (YRSCHL) is 0.0170.  This suggests that, before controlling for all factors 
                                                            
5 The Integrated Public Use Microdata Series reports that values in all years for the total family income variable may be negative. 
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besides Medicaid and CHIP coverage that affect whether an individual is on track with his/her 
educational trajectory, there is a small positive relationship between Medicaid or CHIP coverage and the 
educational variable.  (See Appendix D for full correlation matrix.)  Controlling for the other factors that 
affect the educational variable (variables RELINC, FEMALE, EDUCMOM, EDUCPOP) will provide 
deeper and different insight into this relationship. 
 In running an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression on equation 1 from above, the Medicaid 
payments per child enrollee variable (MCAIDPPE) has a coefficient of nearly zero and is highly 
insignificant with a t-statistic of only 0.46.  As such, there is no conclusive evidence that Medicaid 
payments per child enrollee explain the variation in whether an individual is on track with his/her 
education.  Also, as the data for this variable are only available starting in 2000, including this 
information means dropping all observations from the years 1995-1999.  I have therefore chosen to 
remove this variable from the model6 in order to include all relevant observations from 1995-2006.  
Additionally, including both the mother’s and father’s education variables damages the sample size 
because both pieces of information are not available for all individuals.  Since these two variables are 
highly correlated (with a correlation of 0.6822, see Appendix D for full correlation matrix), I have chosen 






6 An additional issue with the Medicaid payments per child enrollee data is that it does not account for differences in costs of 
living across states.  Because of these differences, the value of a dollar spent on a child Medicaid enrollee is different in different 
states; for example, $1000 in California will not provide as much in terms of health care coverage as it would in, say, Nebraska.  
The lack of adjustment for costs of living could also explain why this variable does not provide significant information for 
explaining the variation in the educational variable. 
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A check for heteroskedasticity is necessary to get reliable results with efficient standard errors.  A 
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity indicates that there is evidence of non-constant 
variance in this sample.  Running a regression of the squared residuals on individual variables from the 
dataset reveals that age is likely the source of the heteroskedasticity as age has a statistically significant 
positive coefficient of 0.009, and the age variable is used in constructing the dependent educational 
variable as well as the POTENTIALEXP and CHIPEXP variables in this model.  This means that there is 
a larger amount of variation in the educational outcome for older individuals.  To correct for this non-
constant variance in age, I will employ White’s heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors.  
Running an OLS regression on equation 2 with White’s heteroskedasticity consistent (robust) 
standard errors yields the following results for the independent variables besides the state dummies and 
the state*Medicaid interaction terms (see Appendix E for full results). 
Table 3. Main Regression Results 
Variable Coefficient Robust Standard Error T-statistic 
HINSCAID -0.0418212*** 0.0060535 -6.91 
UNINSURED -0.0084231*** 0.0007579 -11.11 
RELINC 0.0005024*** 0.0000772 6.5 
FEMALE 0.0146567*** 0.0005035 29.11 
BLACK 0.0001228 0.0009371 0.13 
EDUCMOM 0.0032621*** 0.0001144 28.52 
TIME7 -0.0124789*** 0.0006478 -19.26 
POVERTY -0.0051086*** 0.0014035 -3.64 
ELIGNOTCOV -0.007261*** 0.0011637 -6.24 
POTENTIALEXP 0.2134941*** 0.0110474 19.33 
CHIPEXP 0.0298535*** 0.0043684 6.83 
TAKEUP 0.003917 0.0029161 1.34 
Constant 0.8506558*** 0.0038541 220.72 
N = 135618 
R2 = 0.0504 





 ***Statistically significant at 0.01 level of significance (two-tailed) 
 
                                                            
7 The time trend in this regression is controlling for changes over time that may impact whether children are on track with their 
education; the negative coefficient therefore indicates that there are some circumstantial changes occurring over time that make 
the people in the later survey years less likely to be on track with their education than those in earlier survey years.  
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 These regression results show that the crude take-up rate variable is not statistically significant, 
with a t-statistic of only 1.05.  The crude take-up rate is therefore not informative in this model of an 
individual’s educational trajectory.  This is likely due to the difficulty of properly calculating the take-up 
rate, so a more precise measure of take-up would potentially provide more informative results. 
Although not every individual state dummy variable is independently significant (see Appendix 
E), the state dummies are jointly significant at the 0.05 level, with an F-statistic of 28.23.  The state 
dummies control for what is specific to each state that isn’t captured by other variables.  This may include 
policy differences in the age cut-offs for when children start school or differences in customs regarding 
when parents start sending children to school.  Similarly, while not every state*Medicaid interaction term 
is independently significant, the state*Medicaid interaction terms are jointly significant at the 0.05 level 
of significance with an F-statistic of 3.90.  These interactions terms are important for understanding the 
effect of Medicaid/CHIP coverage in a particular state, and will be discussed later in this section. 
Before addressing the main independent variable, analysis of the coefficients on the demographic 
variables confirms the soundness of the dependent educational variable.  Relative income, the female 
indicator variable, and mother’s education level are all statistically significant and have the sign that one 
would expect based on past research (Haveman & Wolfe, 1995).  The positive relationship between 
relative income and the educational variable indicates that family income has a positive impact on 
education; a child in a family with higher income is more likely to be on track with his/her education.  
Further, the coefficient on the female indicator is significantly positive at the 0.01 level of significance, 
consistent with the notion that females tend to have better educational progress and performance than 
equivalent males.  The coefficient on the race indicator is reported as insignificant.  Although this may be 
surprising, it is consistent with past literature, since many studies have found that race alone is not 
associated significantly with educational attainment when family income and other characteristics are 
included in models (Haveman & Wolfe, 1995).  The coefficients on mother’s educational attainment is 
also significantly positive at the 0.01 level of significance, which is again consistent with other research 
showing that a higher level of parental education means a better educational outcome for the child.  
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Finally, the poverty indicator is significantly negative at the 0.01 level of significance.  This negative 
relationship indicates that poverty has a negative impact on a child’s educational trajectory.  Despite using 
the unconventional educational variable in my model, results for the demographic variables are consistent 
with past research.  We can therefore conclude that this unconventional education variable behaves 
similarly to educational variables used in other literature, such as standardized test scores. 
The main variable of interest in this model is HINSCAID.  This variable indicates whether an 
individual is covered by either Medicaid or CHIP, with a value of 1 indicating that the individual is 
covered by Medicaid or CHIP, and zero indicating otherwise.  The negative coefficient of -0.0418 
suggests that someone who is covered by Medicaid or CHIP is less likely to be on track with his/her 
education than the reference individual, someone who is covered by another form of insurance.  This 
suggests that, after controlling for poverty status and other demographic characteristics, Medicaid/CHIP 
coverage is potentially further accounting for the low-income status of those who are covered.  A 
potential reason for this negative effect may be related to the issue of coverage versus utilization of health 
care coverage; that is, that those who are covered by Medicaid or CHIP are not necessarily using their 
health insurance benefits.  In this case their Medicaid or CHIP coverage is yet another indicator of their 
low-income status rather than a potential indicator of improved access to health care or improved health 
status.  Since other sources of non-Medicaid/CHIP health insurance, such as private health insurance, 
often cover a wider array of health-related costs and reimburse health care providers at higher rates than 
do Medicaid and CHIP (Swartz, 2009), this could translate into better health outcomes and therefore 
better educational outcomes for individuals covered by non-Medicaid health insurance.  The value of        
-0.0418 indicates that being covered by Medicaid or CHIP sets an individual back in his/her educational 
trajectory by 4.18%.  This is not a large enough percentage to set most individuals back by a whole year, 
but it is a significant impact on children’s educational trajectory nonetheless.  This negative relationship 
runs counter to Hypothesis 1, and this result will be further discussed later in this section. 
Similarly to the Medicaid/CHIP coverage indicator potentially serving as an indication of 
something about the beneficiaries’ low-income status, the statistically significant coefficient of -0.007 on 
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ELIGNOTCOV tells us about potential beneficiaries’ low-income status.  In accordance with the idea that 
those who are eligible for but not actually enrolled in Medicaid or CHIP are often those that are in the 
most dire need (Currie, 2004), this negative coefficient indicates that those who are eligible but not 
covered by Medicaid or CHIP are likely those children who have a combination of the worst health status 
and the lowest income levels.  These characteristics may have a negative impact on whether a child is on 
track with his/her education.  Alternatively, this coefficient may be reflecting that a child has ill-informed 
parents who have not enrolled their eligible children in the program. 
The coefficient on the uninsured indicator is -0.008, which demonstrates a negative relationship 
between uninsurance and whether an individual is on track with his/her education.  This means that, 
similarly to someone who is covered by Medicaid or CHIP, someone who is uninsured is less likely to be 
on track than someone who is covered by a non-Medicaid/CHIP form of health insurance.  This is not a 
surprising result given that it is highly likely that someone without any health insurance would be lacking 
access to necessary health services, which could mean an adverse impact on his/her health.  The 
coefficient of -0.008 on the uninsured indicator is smaller in magnitude than the coefficient of -0.0418 on 
the Medicaid/CHIP indicator, so being uninsured sets someone back in his/her educational trajectory by 
0.8%, whereas being on Medicaid or CHIP sets someone back by 4.18%.   This difference in magnitude 
indicates that someone who is covered by Medicaid or CHIP is even less likely to be on track with his/her 
education than someone who is uninsured.  One possible explanation may be that being uninsured does 
not always indicate that a person is low-income; after all, the correlation between relative income and the 
uninsured indicator is relatively weak at only -0.13 (see correlation matrix in Appendix D).  Alternatively, 
this could indicate that children who are uninsured are relatively healthy, thereby mitigating the negative 
impact of uninsurance on the educational variable through having better health status.  While this is a 
notable result, it is one for which the explanation is beyond the scope of this paper. 
The regression of equation 2 tests how the educational variable is different for someone who is 
covered by Medicaid/CHIP as compared to anyone who is covered by non-Medicaid/CHIP health 
insurance.  This result is not surprising as it is reasonable to believe that an individual on Medicaid would 
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be less likely to be on track than someone who is covered by another source of health insurance, 
especially if that insurance is private8.  To see how the educational variable is different for someone who 
is covered by Medicaid/CHIP as compared to others in the poor and near-poor universe, we can restrict 
the sample to those who are poor and near-poor.  This universe shall include people whose relative 
incomes fall below 400% of the poverty cutoff so as to capture all those who are in poverty and who are 
relatively poor, but not considered to be in poverty based on the federal poverty cutoff.  Imposing the 
relative income restriction on the model and removing the relative income variable9, the regression with 
White’s heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors yields the results shown in table 4. 
Another restriction that I can employ to get at the population most likely to be affected by 
Medicaid/CHIP is to restrict the sample to only those who are covered by Medicaid or CHIP and those 
who are uninsured.  Imposing this restriction,10 the regression with robust standard errors yields the 
following results for the Medicaid/CHIP indicator and the demographic variables. 
Table 4. Regression Results for Restricted Universes 
 
Poor and Near-Poor Universe 
(RELINC ≤ 400% FPL) 
Medicaid/CHIP-Covered and Uninsured 
Universe 
Variable Coefficient Robust SE T-Statistic Coefficient Robust SE T-Statistic 
HINSCAID -0.0389172*** 0.0064832 -6.00 -0.0340471*** 0.0077786 -4.38 
UNINSURED -0.0082383*** 0.0009005 -9.15 N/A 
RELINC N/A 0.0013239*** 0.0002821 4.69 
FEMALE 0.0158141*** 0.0006591 23.99 0.0172108*** 0.0010475 16.43 
BLACK -0.0001182 0.0010786 -0.11 -0.0007803 0.001615 -0.48 
EDUCMOM 0.0038849*** 0.0001479 26.27 0.0042781*** 0.000213 20.08 
POVERTY -0.0046478*** 0.0014299 -3.25 -0.0050074*** 0.0018979 -2.64 
Constant 0.8508453*** 0.0050728 167.73 0.8592466*** 0.0105282 81.61 
 
N = 87381 
R2 = 0.0526 
F(108, 87272) = 37.70 
N = 40734 
R2 = 0.0603 
F(108, 40624) = 21.72 
***Statistically significant at 0.01 level of significance (two-tailed) 
 
                                                            
8 Private insurance is most often employer-sponsored, so having private health insurance indicates higher and more stable 
income, which is likely positively related to the education variable.  If an individual is covered by private health insurance that is 
not employer-sponsored, then he/she must have the disposable income to purchase that insurance, so the same logic follows. 
9 Because the sample is being restricted based on the relative income variable, there will necessarily be less variation in the 
relative income and poverty status data, so the variables are removed from the regression. 
10 Because the sample is being restricted based on the uninsured variable, there will necessarily be less variation in the uninsured 
variable data, so the variable is removed from the regression. 
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After imposing the first restriction, the Medicaid/CHIP indicator variable still has a negative 
coefficient.  This indicates that people who are covered by Medicaid or CHIP are less likely to be on track 
with their education as compared to others in the poor and near-poor universe who have other sources of 
insurance, as well as compared to otherwise insured people in the unrestricted sample.  The magnitude of 
this coefficient is slightly smaller than in the regression for the unrestricted sample, setting individuals 
covered by Medicaid or CHIP back by 3.89% of their lives as compared to 4.18%.  Although this is a 
small difference, it shows that, compared to people who are otherwise insured in the sample of poor and 
near-poor individuals, those covered by Medicaid/CHIP are slightly less negatively impacted in their 
educational trajectories than they are when compared to anyone who is otherwise insured, regardless of 
income.  This is an unexpected result as it provides evidence to the contrary of Hypothesis 1. 
 After imposing the second restriction, the coefficient on the Medicaid/CHIP indicator is again 
negative.  This indicates that people who are covered by Medicaid or CHIP are less likely to be on track 
with their education as compared to others in the sample who are uninsured.  As with the previous 
restriction, the magnitude of this coefficient is smaller than in the regression for the unrestricted sample, 
setting individuals covered by Medicaid or CHIP back by 3.4% as compared to 4.18%.   This is consistent 
with the small negative coefficient on the uninsured indicator in the main regression (see table 3) 
discussed above.  These results suggest that someone who is covered by Medicaid or CHIP is even less 
likely to be on track with his/her education than someone who is uninsured.  Again, one possible 
explanation may be that being uninsured does not always indicate that a person is low-income or 
unhealthy.  It is not surprising that restricting the sample to these universes doesn’t reveal very different 
results.  Restricting the sample controls for the ways in which people are different in terms of their 
relative income, poverty status, and insurance coverage.  Assuming that I have already correctly 
controlled for these variables in my model, restricting the sample will not yield different results. 
Another way to analyze the data for the research question at hand is to change the structure of the 
dependent variable.  Since the share of life in school variable (YRSCHL) is non-linear, it is somewhat 
difficult to interpret what the coefficient means as the effect of Medicaid/CHIP coverage will be different 
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for people at different ages.  That is, a 16-year-old being 4.18% behind in his/her education is very 
different from a 7-year-old being 4.18% behind.  For ease of interpretation, I have also created a 
dependent variable to indicate whether a person is on track.  This variable (ONTRACK) indicates whether 
a person is on track in school relative to his/her age group.  An individual is considered to be off track 
(and given a value of 0) if his/her share of life in school is less than one standard deviation below the 
average share of life in school for that age group.  Using this on-track indicator tells us about the 
likelihood of a child being on track, and regressing this variable yields the following results (excluding 
results for state dummies and state*Medicaid interaction terms). 
Table 5. Regression Results with ONTRACK Dependent Variable, Unrestricted Universe 
Variable Coefficient Robust Standard Error T-statistic 
HINSCAID -0.1140302*** 0.0198864 -5.73 
UNINSURED -0.0264565*** 0.002013 -13.14 
RELINC 0.0012273*** 0.000143 8.59 
FEMALE 0.0245382*** 0.0012095 20.29 
BLACK -0.0077051*** 0.0024391 -3.16 
EDUCMOM 0.0086309*** 0.0002849 30.3 
TIME -0.0393622*** 0.0013275 -29.65 
POVERTY -0.0158557*** 0.0040685 -3.9 
ELIGNOTCOV -0.0238182*** 0.0031885 -7.47 
POTENTIALEXP 0.6579016*** 0.0212576 30.95 
CHIPEXP 0.0771499*** 0.0115762 6.66 
TAKEUP 0.01092 0.0071462 1.53 
Constant 0.8931469*** 0.0091827 97.26 
N = 135618 
R2 = 0.0530 





***Statistically significant at 0.01 level of significance (two-tailed) 
 
After changing the structure of the dependent variable into this dummy indicator of whether an 
individual is on track, we do not see much change in the relationship between Medicaid/CHIP coverage 
and whether an individual is on track with his/her education.  The coefficient on the main variable, 
HINSCAID, is significantly negative.  This means that someone who is covered by Medicaid or CHIP is 
more likely to be off track in his/her education, which is consistent with the results from the regression on 
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the YRSCHL variable.  The magnitude of the coefficient on HINSCAID in this regression is -0.114, 
which suggests that someone who is covered by Medicaid or CHIP is 11.4% more likely to be off track 
than someone who is otherwise insured.  Other results in this regression reinforce the previous results; the 
coefficients on the demographic variables are still as expected.  For example, the coefficient on mother’s 
education (EDUCMOM) is significantly positive, meaning that someone whose mother has a higher level 
of educational attainment is less likely to be off track.    This consistency of results holds for nearly all of 
the variables shown above in table 5, so it is clear that changing the structure of the dependent variable 
from the share of life spent in school to the on-track indicator does not yield substantially different results. 
Now that multiple iterations of sample restrictions and of the dependent variable have all 
provided similar results, I shall return to focusing on the original unrestricted regression.  To understand 
the full effect of Medicaid/CHIP coverage, we must not only analyze the effect of the HINSCAID 
variable on its own, but also via the state*Medicaid interaction terms, as these are constructed using the 
HINSCAID indicator.  There are a handful of states for which the state*Medicaid interaction term is 
significantly positive, as noted in the table below.  This indicates that being on Medicaid or CHIP in these 
particular states mitigates the negative impact of just being on Medicaid or CHIP at all.  However, the 
total effect of Medicaid coverage in one state is determined by the sum of the coefficient on the 
HINSCAID variable and the coefficient on the state*Medicaid interaction term for that state.  Testing the 
linear combinations of the HINSCAID coefficient and each of the state interaction terms from equation 2 
(in the unrestricted sample of all children ages 6-19) yields the following results: 
Table 6. Linear Combinations of Coefficients on HINSCAID and State*Medicaid Terms 
State Sum of Coefficients Robust Standard Error T-statistic 
Alabama -0.0529215*** 0.007861 -6.73 
Alaska+ -0.0233709*** 0.0059062 -3.96 
Arizona -0.289119*** 0.0066749 -4.33 
Arkansas -0.039995*** 0.0078023 -5.13 
California× -0.0204813*** 0.0030366 -6.74 
Colorado -0.260784*** 0.0091191 -2.86 
Connecticut -0.0394877*** 0.0064407 -6.13 
Delaware -0.0557355*** 0.0112506 -4.95 
District of Columbia -0.0325314*** 0.0077998 -4.17 
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Florida -0.0302319*** 0.0048776 -6.20 
Georgia -0.0418681*** 0.0063184 -6.63 
Hawaii -0.0289277*** 0.0072267 -4.00 
Idaho -0.0283674*** 0.006351 -4.47 
Illinois+ -0.0248393*** 0.0046021 -5.40 
Indiana× -0.0171621** 0.0077035 -2.23 
Iowa -0.0460582*** 0.008362 -5.51 
Kansas -0.0322037*** 0.0078703 -4.09 
Kentucky -0.0381319*** 0.0061351 -6.22 
Louisiana -0.0690629*** 0.0087109 -7.93 
Maine -0.0413595*** 0.0055622 -7.44 
Maryland -0.0356297*** 0.009041 -3.94 
Massachusetts× -0.0136993** 0.005471 -2.50 
Michigan -0.0365672*** 0.0052416 -6.98 
Minnesota× -0.0175278*** 0.0061682 -2.84 
Mississippi -0.0428505*** 0.0071842 -5.96 
Missouri -0.0305208*** 0.0082136 -3.72 
Montana+ -0.0238378*** 0.0071657 -3.33 
Nebraska -0.04153*** 0.0093663 -4.43 
Nevada+ -0.0166373 0.0108482 -1.53 
New Hampshire -0.0374184*** 0.0107966 -3.47 
New Jersey+ -0.0234046*** 0.0061795 -3.79 
New Mexico× -0.0219781*** 0.005354 -4.10 
New York -0.0362817*** 0.0038304 -9.47 
North Carolina -0.0363043*** 0.0062135 -5.84 
North Dakota -0.0277527*** 0.0069535 -3.99 
Ohio -0.0303021*** 0.0046783 -6.48 
Oklahoma -0.0394631*** 0.0078724 -5.01 
Oregon× -0.013736* 0.007444 -1.85 
Pennsylvania -0.034523*** 0.0052573 -6.57 
Rhode Island -0.0289161*** 0.0072502 -3.99 
South Carolina -0.0503599*** 0.0080223 -6.28 
South Dakota -0.0361198*** 0.0074074 -4.88 
Tennessee -0.0317342*** 0.0075404 -4.21 
Texas -0.0335325*** 0.004146 -8.09 
Utah -0.0282336*** 0.0064851 -4.35 
Vermont -0.0418212*** 0.0060535 -6.91 
Virginia -0.0369084*** 0.0088017 -4.19 
Washington× -0.0199157*** 0.0059272 -3.36 
West Virginia Manually omitted to avoid collinearity 
Wisconsin+ -0.0245847*** 0.0065912 -3.73 
Wyoming -0.0467062*** 0.0073861 -6.32 
***Significant at 0.01 level (two-tailed) 
**Significant at 0.05 level (two-tailed) 
*Significant at 0.10 level (two-tailed) 
× State*Medicaid interaction term is independently 
significant and positive at 0.01 level 
+ State*Medicaid interaction term is independently 




 These results show that all of the linear combinations of the HINSCAID coefficient and the 
state*Medicaid coefficients are negative.  This suggests that, consistent with the HINSCAID variable 
being negative on its own, being covered by Medicaid/CHIP in a given year in any state makes an 
individual less likely to be on track with his/her education, as compared to someone who is otherwise 
insured and is above the poverty line.  This result runs counter to Hypothesis 2.  The original hypotheses 
were based on the idea that Medicaid coverage improves health for those who are covered and thereby 
improves educational outcomes, as well as on the idea that Medicaid coverage may free up financial 
resources and thereby allow parents to spend less on health expenses and more on other expenses, such as 
those related to childcare and education.  However, these negative linear combinations of the coefficients 
tell us otherwise.  As stated earlier, the negative coefficient here is perhaps telling us about three possible 
ideas: 1) the Medicaid indicator may be capturing something more about the low-income status of those 
who are covered by Medicaid or CHIP that is not already being explained by the other control variables, 
2) the potential discrepancy between coverage and utilization, and 3) the potential discrepancy in quality 
and scope of services between Medicaid/CHIP and other sources of health insurance. 
 Despite expectations that high-ranking states in the Ramirez de Arellano & Wolfe (2007) report 
would have more positive (or less negative) effects from Medicaid/CHIP coverage, there is no discernible 
state pattern in the sizes of these linear combinations, so this analysis does not find support for 
Hypothesis 3.  For example, the sum of the coefficient on HINSCAID and on the state*Medicaid 
interaction term for Massachusetts is the least negative out of all of the statistically significant coefficient 
sums with a sum of -0.0136993, so if Hypothesis 3 holds, this would be an indication of Massachusetts 
having a higher standing in the Medicaid program quality rankings.  This pattern seems to hold at first 
glance, as Massachusetts is ranked #1 overall and #8 for eligibility.  The initial match-up of a high quality 
program with a small negative impact falls apart when we look at the next least negative sum; this sum is 
-0.013736 for Oregon, which is ranked #12 overall and #19 for eligibility. Further, the next least negative 
sum of coefficients is for Indiana at -0.0171621, but Indiana is ranked at #45 overall and #51 for 
eligibility.  The lack of pattern may well be attributed to the inherently imperfect nature of the Ramirez de 
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Arellano & Wolfe rankings, which are an attempt at making value judgments of states’ Medicaid 
programs and may not truly capture the “quality” of a program in terms of its ability to improve health 
outcomes for beneficiaries.  Second, the Ramirez de Arellano & Wolfe rankings were constructed based 
on eligibility, reimbursement, scope of services, and quality of care, with eligibility being the most 
heavily weighted criterion.  In determining the effect of Medicaid/CHIP coverage on the educational 
variable, it may ultimately be more useful to look at the scope of services and quality of care, as these 
factors may have a more direct effect on health status than does eligibility, and that effect on health status 
is pertinent to the educational outcome11.  Third, because the results for the effect of Medicaid/CHIP 
coverage went against my first two hypotheses, it follows that the original hypotheses about the higher 
state rankings meaning more positive effects on the educational variable will also not hold. 
 Due to the cross-sectional nature of these data, these negative results tell us about the current 
effect on education of an individual being covered by Medicaid or CHIP in a given year, while it is likely 
that there are more cumulative effects of Medicaid/CHIP coverage.  Without data tracking individuals 
over time, we cannot know whether someone was covered by Medicaid or CHIP earlier in his/her life and 
how that affects his/her educational trajectory in the survey year.  But because CHIP was introduced as an 
eligibility expansion in 1997, it is possible to measure the potential exposure of an individual to the wider 
eligibility for CHIP, represented in the model by POTENTIALEXP and CHIPEXP.  The positive and 
statistically significant coefficient of 0.213 (see table 3) on the POTENTIALEXP variable indicates that 
the greater the proportion of a child’s life that CHIP has been in existence, regardless of whether that 
child is actually covered by CHIP or Medicaid, the more likely that individual is to be on track with 
his/her education.  Because a child’s potential exposure to CHIP increases over time, this indicates a 
cumulative effect of the existence of CHIP for all individuals in the age 6-19 sample.   
 In conjunction with the positive coefficient on POTENTIALEXP, there is also a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient of 0.03 (see table 3) on the CHIPEXP variable.  This variable is 
                                                            
11 Upon brief observation, there is no immediately apparent pattern in matching the states with the least negative coefficient sums 
to the highest ranking states for these categories.  However, it is possible that further empirical examination of these categories 
could show otherwise, so this may be an avenue for further research. 
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constructed as an interaction term of POTENTIALEXP*HINSCAID and therefore provides insight into 
the effect of the proportion of a child’s life that CHIP has been in existence on the educational variable 
specifically for people who are currently covered by Medicaid or CHIP.  The positive coefficient on 
CHIPEXP indicates that those who are covered by Medicaid or CHIP and have had longer potential 
exposure to CHIP are even more likely than others in the sample to be on track with their education.  To 
further illustrate this point, the sum of the coefficients on these two variables is 0.243, and a test of this 
linear combination yields a t-statistic of 21.18, making this value highly statistically significant.  Again, 
as a child’s potential exposure to CHIP increases over time, this suggests a cumulative effect of the 
existence of CHIP.  The negative coefficient on the Medicaid/CHIP coverage variable is therefore likely 
indicating that current Medicaid/CHIP coverage has a negative impact on the educational variable at one 
point in time, but the positive coefficients on POTENTIALEXP and CHIPEXP indicate that CHIP 
coverage may have a positive cumulative impact on the educational variable over time rather than at just 
one point in a child’s life. Further, the sum of the coefficients on these two variables and the negative 
coefficient on HINSCAID is 0.202, and a test of this linear combination yields a t-statistic of 15.98.  This 
means that the positive combined cumulative effect of Medicaid/CHIP coverage indicated by the 
POTENTIALEXP and CHIPEXP variables is big enough to outweigh the negative contemporaneous 
effect of being on Medicaid/CHIP in a given year. 
 These results also suggest a possible positive externality of CHIP’s existence – beyond the 
potential exposure to CHIP improving the educational outcome just for those who are actually covered by 
Medicaid or CHIP (shown by the CHIPEXP interaction term), exposure also improves outcomes for 
anyone in the sample (shown by POTENTIALEXP).  This possible externality may be thought of as 
similar to the positive externalities associated with other facets of health care, such as immunizations.  
When someone gets vaccinated for a certain disease, that person is himself less likely to contract that 
disease, and by extension, other people in that person’s environment are also less likely to contract that 
disease (Boulier, Datta, & Goldfarb, 2007).  The same logic may follow for CHIP; greater access to 
health insurance coverage for low-income children, signified by a greater proportion of one’s life during 
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which CHIP has been in existence, may make those children healthier, and by extension, make others 
around them healthier as well and therefore more likely to be on track with their education. 
 These results were not what this study sought out to discover and firmer conclusions require data 
more specific to the individual, but the possibility of cumulative effects of Medicaid/CHIP coverage is 
notable and shall be important for further investigating the relationship between Medicaid/CHIP and 
whether an individual is on track with his/her education.  Furthermore, the possible existence of 
cumulative rather than incremental effects of Medicaid/CHIP coverage may help explain the overall 
negative impact of Medicaid/CHIP coverage found here, as well as the lack of pattern for the state-by-
state effects of Medicaid and CHIP and how they line up with the Ramirez de Arellano & Wolfe rankings. 
VII. Discussion and Conclusions 
 This analysis finds evidence inconsistent with the hypothesis that health insurance coverage for 
children through Medicaid and CHIP improves the likelihood that those children are on track with their 
education.  There were two main causal pathways underlying the hypothesis: 1) Medicaid coverage may 
improve health, and that improvement in health may improve the educational variable; 2) Medicaid being 
a publicly-funded program could free up financial resources for parents to reallocate from health expenses 
to education-related expenses.  The lack of evidence to support this hypothesis likely signals a break in 
the causal pathway.  It is possible that Medicaid coverage indeed does not improve health or that, if it 
does improve health, that health improvement does not have a strong impact toward improving the 
educational variable.  It is also possible that having Medicaid or CHIP coverage in a given year does not 
free up enough financial resources to make a positive impact on the educational variable, or that if it does 
free up financial resources, that those resources are not redirected to expenditures that could increase the 
likelihood that a child is on track with his/her educational trajectory.  Additionally, Medicaid/CHIP 
coverage in one year cannot change the situation if a person was already off track before being covered. 
 Beyond the evidence not supporting the main hypothesis of this study, there is statistically 
significant evidence to the contrary.  This analysis shows that currently being covered by Medicaid or 
CHIP makes children less likely to be on track with their education than people who are otherwise 
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insured.  This is the case both when the sample includes children from all income levels, when the sample 
is restricted to the poor and near-poor, thus focusing on those who could potentially benefit from 
Medicaid and CHIP coverage, and when the sample is restricted to only those covered by Medicaid/CHIP 
and those who are uninsured. The negative impact of Medicaid/CHIP coverage on whether an individual 
is on track may be indicative of several ideas.  First, the Medicaid/CHIP coverage could be signaling 
something about the low-income status of the beneficiary that is not already being explained by the 
relative income and poverty indicator variables.  This would be especially pertinent if there is a gap 
between someone being covered by Medicaid or CHIP and whether that person actually uses the health 
care services available through that insurance.  For there to be an improvement in the educational variable 
as a result of the Medicaid-better health-better education pathway, there must first be that direct impact of 
Medicaid coverage on health outcomes; if an individual is covered by Medicaid or CHIP but is not 
utilizing those health services, improved health outcomes are unlikely, and the causal chain falls apart.  
Having Medicaid or CHIP coverage may then be pointing to the fact that the individual in question is at a 
low enough income level to be eligible for coverage, but if the coverage goes unused, the variable is 
picking up residual effects of the low-income status not already captured by the poverty indicator. 
 Second, the Medicaid/CHIP coverage could be an indicator of potentially lower quality of care 
and/or fewer available health services covered by Medicaid and CHIP policies.  Medicaid and CHIP pay 
health providers at rates below the private market rate.  Also, there is a history of low-income people 
being treated at facilities with smaller funds (Swartz, 2009).  Therefore, those who are covered by these 
public forms of health insurance may be receiving health services inferior to those received by people 
who are otherwise insured.  The differences in the quality and scope of care provided by different types of 
insurance and the impact that those quality differences can have on health may also explain the 
differences that we see in the indirect effect of the type of health insurance on the educational variable.  
 These results are contrary to those in other studies on the relationship between public health 
insurance coverage and educational outcomes.  Where Alcaraz, Chiquiar, Orraca, & Salcedo (2012) and 
Levine & Schanzenbach (2009) find that public health insurance coverage improved children’s academic 
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performance, I find that current health insurance coverage through Medicaid and CHIP has a negative 
impact on children’s progress in school.  One reason for the difference between the results in the present 
study and those in the Alcaraz et. al study may stem from the differences in the characteristics of the 
public health insurance programs – Seguro Popular is intended to provide universal public health 
insurance coverage free of charge to Mexican families, while Medicaid is limited to providing health 
insurance to the poor.  Because SP is intended to be completely free of charge and because it is intended 
to ultimately cover the whole population, it may be more likely to lead to an income effect such that 
families have more resources to spend on education-related expenses than Medicaid would have. 
 The differences in the methodologies of my research and of Levine & Schanzenbach’s research 
are most likely the cause of the opposing results.  First, their educational variable was standardized test 
scores, which get at academic performance, whereas my educational variable does not tell us about 
measured performance, but about a child’s ability to stay on track.  It is likely that there is a difference in 
the effect of Medicaid and CHIP coverage on these different educational variables.  Second, Levine & 
Schanzenbach used their cross-sectional data to create a system of simulated instruments to project back 
into each individual’s past and predict whether a person would have been eligible for coverage under the 
rules in each state based on the child’s age and family income, then ran those simulated responses through 
a program that would identify their simulated health insurance eligibility at birth, in the years since birth, 
and at present depending on when they were born.  Their results showed a positive statistically significant 
relationship between eligibility at birth and reading scores.  These researchers essentially formulated their 
own longitudinal measure of Medicaid/CHIP coverage to look at Medicaid coverage in the past as it 
relates to academic achievement in the present, whereas my approach focuses on both aspects of the 
relationship in the present.  As such, the Levine & Schanzenbach study gets at a cumulative effect of 
Medicaid coverage at birth on current academic performance, while my data allows mostly for analyzing 
the incremental effect of Medicaid coverage at one given point in time.  A similarity between my results 
and those of the Levine & Schanzenbach study, however, is that the potential exposure to CHIP variable 
provides some insight into the potentially cumulative effects of public health insurance coverage through 
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Medicaid and CHIP.  The joint effect of the POTENTIALEXP and CHIPEXP variables in this analysis is 
greater in magnitude than the effect of the HINSCAID variable, so it is possible that the potentially 
cumulative effects of Medicaid/CHIP coverage outweigh the negative effects of Medicaid/CHIP coverage 
in a given year.  This is consistent with the findings of the Levine & Schanzenbach study, as they point to 
the effect of coverage at birth over time, i.e. a cumulative effect, as the driving factor behind the improved 
academic performance.  This similarity of results points to the importance of the idea of a cumulative 
impact of Medicaid/CHIP coverage in analyzing educational outcomes.  I did not originally set out to find 
effects of exposure to a public health insurance policy on whether children are on track with their 
education.  This finding, coupled with the evidence of cumulative effects from Levine & Schanzenbach, 
therefore warrants further investigation and suggests a topic for future research in the field of the indirect 
effects of public health insurance coverage through Medicaid and CHIP. 
 This analysis also does not find any evidence to support the hypothesis that states with 
qualitatively “better” Medicaid and CHIP policies have more positive effects on the educational variable.  
This could be due to the specific methodology of the rankings system in the Ramirez de Arellano & 
Wolfe report, as well as to the idea that a state Medicaid or CHIP program deemed to be “high quality” 
does not necessarily translate into high take-up of the program or, even further, into high usage of the 
benefits of the program.  However, past research (Long & Coughlin, 2002) has shown that there is a 
relationship between different states’ Medicaid policies (represented by their per capita Medicaid 
expenditures) and access and use of health care for Medicaid beneficiaries. Long & Coughlin found that 
those states with higher Medicaid spending per low-income child saw increased access to and use of 
health care services, and this increase in utilization may be expected to translate into a positive impact on 
health.  I chose to use Ramirez de Arellano & Wolfe’s system of Medicaid policy quality rankings in this 
analysis so as to get a more nuanced look at program quality, beyond just taking higher spending 
measures to indicate quality.  The lack of evidence of a pattern in this study suggests either that such a 
relationship between supposedly higher quality state Medicaid programs and health care utilization and 
health outcomes that we see in the Long & Coughlin study does not extend to the educational variable 
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here or that such a pattern truly does not exist.  As stated earlier, the lack of pattern may be due to the 
consequences inherent in employing a value-based system of quality rankings, or to the way in which the 
rankings focus on the types of people and services that are available for coverage rather than on the 
number of people who actually participate in the program and on the types of services that are actually 
used by those participants.  In addition, it is possible that if a study could capture the cumulative effects of 
program quality, that is, how the program quality in the past affects health and educational outcomes in 
the present, a more discernible pattern could be revealed. 
 To better understand the relationship between Medicaid/CHIP coverage and whether an 
individual is on track with his/her educational trajectory, it is necessary to have information on 
individuals’ health insurance coverage history.  This would be best provided by a longitudinal survey 
tracking individuals’ health insurance coverage and medical care, health status, and educational progress 
over time.  Alternatively, a cross-sectional data source that contains information on respondents’ past 
health insurance coverage could provide similar insight into the relationship in question.  To my 
knowledge, there is currently no data source available that provides all this information, so it is currently 
difficult to get at the core of the cumulative effects of public health insurance coverage for children’s 
education.  Further research in this area must therefore depend on the data sources that are already 
available and must continue to develop economic approaches to find evidence of indirect effects of 
Medicaid coverage accordingly.  If further research of this nature continues to find significant indirect 
effects of Medicaid and CHIP on educational variables, then perhaps the subject warrants the creation of 
such a survey to provide the full gamut of necessary data. 
 Regardless of the specifics of the results of this study and of past research, there is evidence that 
there is indeed a relationship between Medicaid/CHIP coverage and whether an individual is on track 
with his/her education, although the results of this study were not as expected.  This is an important 
insight, as it suggests that there are economic and social effects of public health insurance coverage that 
extend beyond the immediate impact on health.  This is a topic area ripe for further research, especially in 
light of recent developments in the American health care system with the Affordable Care Act.  Will the 
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further expansion of coverage to more Americans have different effects on educational variables?  Will 
children who are born later and who will therefore have more exposure to the provisions of the 
Affordable Care Act see different effects than those studied in earlier years?  If this study were to be 
repeated with data from, say, 2017, would we still see a negative relationship between Medicaid/CHIP 
coverage and the educational variable in a given year?  In the meantime, further research on past data 
would be useful in gaining a better understanding of the potential indirect benefits and consequences of 
Medicaid and CHIP coverage, and such research could ultimately be useful in predicting how the 











Appendix A: Overall Medicaid Rankings – from Ramirez de Arellano & Wolfe (2007) 
Rank State Score (out of 1000) 
1 Massachusetts 645.9 
2 Nebraska 625.5 
3 Vermont 616.1 
4 Alaska 609.9 
5 Wisconsin 606.8 
6 Rhode Island 600.0 
7 Minnesota 591.2 
8 New York 560.2 
9 Washington 550.0 
10 New Hampshire 548.9 
11 Hawaii 547.1 
12 Oregon 544.0 
13 Maine 528.4 
14 California 525.7 
15 Maryland 523.3 
16 Montana 512.5 
17 Iowa 510.2 
18 North Carolina 506.6 
19 Connecticut 505.8 
20 Kentucky 496.6 
21 Utah 480.9 
22 Delaware 476.8 
23 Michigan 475.8 
24 Arizona 474.5 
25 West Virginia 474.4 
26 Florida 467.7 
27 District of Columbia 462.9 
28 Louisiana 457.3 
29 Ohio 451.7 
30 New Mexico 447.0 
31 North Dakota 443.2 
32 Illinois 439.6 
33 Pennsylvania 437.8 
33 Wyoming 437.8 
35 Kansas 432.4 
36 Georgia 426.1 
37 Virginia 423.5 
38 Arkansas 415.7 
39 New Jersey 410.7 
40 Nevada 405.0 
41 Missouri 379.1 
42 Alabama 376.3 
43 Colorado 375.7 
44 South Carolina 364.0 
45 Indiana 357.2 
46 South Dakota 352.6 
47 Oklahoma 336.7 
48 Texas 335.5 
49 Idaho 325.2 
50 Mississippi 317.8 
*Since Tennessee does not have any practitioners paid under fee-for-service, it lacks indicators for the reimbursement category. Because of the lack of comparability 
with other states, there is no way to rank this state in terms of reimbursement. It is also impossible to compute an overall score for Tennessee. 
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Appendix B: Eligibility Category Rankings – from Ramirez de Arellano & Wolfe (2007) 
Rank State Score (out of 350) 
1 Rhode Island 296.8 
2 Vermont 283.7 
3 New York 264.8 
4 Washington 260.9 
5 California 258.9 
6 Minnesota 254.5 
7 District of Columbia 248.5 
8 Massachusetts 247.6 
9 Wisconsin 246.6 
10 Hawaii 245.0 
11 Louisiana 228.7 
12 Maryland 226.4 
13 Nebraska 220.1 
14 Connecticut 218.7 
15 Michigan 217.0 
16 New Jersey 216.8 
17 New Hampshire 211.3 
18 Maine 210.0 
19 Oregon 204.9 
20 Pennsylvania 198.3 
21 Oklahoma 193.3 
22 Georgia 190.9 
23 Arkansas 190.0 
24 North Carolina 188.9 
25 Iowa 186.0 
26 Kansas 183.0 
27 Florida 182.4 
28 Tennessee 175.2 
29 Utah 167.4 
30 Kentucky 162.8 
31 New Mexico 160.1 
32 Montana 159.7 
33 Alaska 159.3 
33 West Virginia 157.5 
35 Ohio 144.9 
36 Illinois 143.6 
37 Missouri 141.8 
38 North Dakota 139.8 
39 Wyoming 133.7 
40 South Carolina 132.7 
41 Colorado 131.8 
42 Virginia 131.0 
43 Delaware 127.1 
44 Idaho 117.1 
45 Texas 110.3 
46 Nevada 108.5 
47 South Dakota 101.1 
48 Arizona 95.5 
49 Mississippi 92.6 
50 Alabama 91.6 
51 Indiana 90.6 
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Appendix C: State Income Eligibility Guidelines (% of Federal Poverty Line) – Medicaid for Children Age 6-16, July 2000 






























New Hampshire 185 
New Jersey 133 
New Mexico 235 
New York 100 
North Carolina 100 





Rhode Island 250 
South Carolina 150 






































































Appendix E: Regression Results (Equation 2) for State Dummies and State*Medicaid Interaction Terms 
 
Variable Coefficient Robust Standard Error T-Statistic 
AL -0.0051047 0.0028607 -1.78 
AK 0.0003945 0.0029326 0.13 
AZ 0.0024682 0.0028117 0.88 
AR 9.32E-06 0.003368 0 
CA 0.0241335*** 0.0019665 12.27 
CO 0.0030381 0.002895 1.05 
CT 0.0125283*** 0.002957 4.24 
DE 0.0031534 0.0031407 1 
DC 0.011003** 0.0043571 2.53 
FL 0.0021178 0.0022572 0.94 
GA -0.0116394*** 0.003029 -3.84 
HI 0.0261768*** 0.0031759 8.24 
ID 0.0021603 0.0031844 0.68 
IL 0.0083523*** 0.0022989 3.63 
IN -0.0171325*** 0.0027575 -6.21 
IA -0.0045821* 0.0025304 -1.81 
KS -0.0052623* 0.0029375 -1.79 
KY 0.000936 0.0030371 0.31 
LA -0.000333 0.0034845 -0.1 
ME 0.0010575 0.0029007 0.36 
MD 0.019291*** 0.0032301 5.97 
MA 0.0091587*** 0.0025967 3.53 
MI 0.003967* 0.0023257 1.71 
MN -0.0047643 0.0031567 -1.51 
MS -0.011697*** 0.0030531 -3.83 
MO -0.0010589 0.0033914 -0.31 
MT -0.0099795*** 0.0029552 -3.38 
NE -0.0003576 0.0030862 -0.12 
NV 0.0127935*** 0.0031122 4.11 
NH -0.0063336** 0.0026125 -2.42 
NJ 0.0127963*** 0.0024495 5.22 
NM 0.0073702** 0.0033709 2.19 
NY 0.0183735*** 0.0021848 8.41 
NC 0.0013427 0.0025891 0.52 
ND -0.0071652*** 0.002515 -2.85 
OH -0.0042887 0.0026851 -1.6 
OK -0.0082653** 0.0032532 -2.54 
OR 0.0043757 0.0029445 1.49 
PA -0.0027333 0.002294 -1.19 
RI 0.0130822*** 0.0033141 3.95 
SC 0.0065992** 0.0031511 2.09 
SD -0.0136067*** 0.0026304 -5.17 
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TN 0 (omitted)  
TX -0.0053891** 0.0023184 -2.32 
UT 0.003102 0.0025037 1.24 
VT 0 (omitted)  
VA 0.0027731 0.0027696 1 
WA -0.0021184 0.0031066 -0.68 
WI -0.0020391 0.0027855 -0.73 
WY -0.0048769* 0.0026188 -1.86 
mcaidAL -0.0111002 0.0095971 -1.16 
mcaidAK 0.0184504** 0.0081313 2.27 
mcaidAZ 0.0129093 0.008673 1.49 
mcaidAR 0.0018262 0.0095204 0.19 
mcaidCA 0.02134*** 0.0062937 3.39 
mcaidCO 0.0157429 0.0105991 1.49 
mcaidCT 0.0023336 0.0084862 0.27 
mcaidDE -0.0139143 0.0125353 -1.11 
mcaidDC 0.0092898 0.0095219 0.98 
mcaidFL 0.0115893 0.0074131 1.56 
mcaidGA -0.0000469 0.0084172 -0.01 
mcaidHI 0.0128935 0.0091479 1.41 
mcaidID 0.0134538 0.0084549 1.59 
mcaidIL 0.0169819** 0.0072465 2.34 
mcaidIN 0.0246591*** 0.0094711 2.6 
mcaidIA -0.004237 0.0100247 -0.42 
mcaidKS 0.0096175 0.0096146 1 
mcaidKY 0.0036893 0.0083025 0.44 
mcaidLA -0.0272416*** 0.0102997 -2.64 
mcaidME 0.0004617 0.0078272 0.06 
mcaidMD 0.0061916 0.0106473 0.58 
mcaidMA 0.028122*** 0.0078811 3.57 
mcaidMI 0.005254 0.0076878 0.68 
mcaidMN 0.0242934*** 0.0083316 2.92 
mcaidMS -0.0010292 0.0091005 -0.11 
mcaidMO 0.0113005 0.0099505 1.14 
mcaidMT 0.0179834** 0.0090869 1.98 
mcaidNE 0.0002912 0.0109449 0.03 
mcaidNV 0.0251839** 0.0121134 2.08 
mcaidNH 0.0044029 0.012133 0.36 
mcaidNJ 0.0184166** 0.0083476 2.21 
mcaidNM 0.0198432*** 0.0077282 2.57 
mcaidNY 0.0055395 0.0067496 0.82 
mcaidNC 0.0055169 0.0083383 0.66 
mcaidND 0.0140685 0.0089023 1.58 
mcaidOH 0.0115191 0.0073154 1.57 
50 
 
mcaidOK 0.0023581 0.0096779 0.24 
mcaidOR 0.0280853*** 0.0093003 3.02 
mcaidPA 0.0072982 0.0076423 0.95 
mcaidRI 0.0129051 0.0090044 1.43 
mcaidSC -0.0085387 0.0097496 -0.88 
mcaidSD 0.0057014 0.0092395 0.62 
mcaidTN 0.010087 0.0093056 1.08 
mcaidTX 0.0082888 0.0068977 1.2 
mcaidUT 0.0135876 0.0085218 1.59 
mcaidVT 0 (omitted)  
mcaidVA 0.0049128 0.010384 0.47 
mcaidWA 0.0219055*** 0.0081227 2.7 
mcaidWI 0.0172365** 0.0085915 2.01 
mcaidWY -0.0048849 0.0092333 -0.53 
***Significant at the 0.01 level of significance 
**Significant at the 0.05 level of significance 
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